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ABSTRACT 
Allison Johnson: The Balkans is our Neighborhood, Europe is Our Destiny 
(Under the direction of Don Searing) 
 
On July 1, 2013 Croatia became the first state significantly impacted by the Yugoslav 
wars to join the European Union. While Croatia was able to progress from a new country in a 
state of war to an EU member state in just two decades, the country’s accession process was 
certainly difficult. In addition to structural reforms, the EU pushed Croatian governments to 
implement a progressive regional policy and help neighboring countries carry out similar 
reforms. This goal required Croatia to build relations with other members of the former 
Yugoslavia, including former enemies. 
This paper analyzes the actions taken by Croatian governments and presidents to build 
relations with its bordering states, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro, 
but also Kosovo because Croatia has taken the initiative to become its most vocal ally in the 
region. The paper concludes that Croatia, as a newcomer to foreign relations, has progressed 
substantially from its nationalistic past and currently has good relations with its most immediate 
neighbors. There is still substantial room for improvement in the case of the Croatian-Serbian 
relationship, but it is certainly much better now than immediately after the wars of the former 
Yugoslavia. Croatia has been substantially influenced by its EU accession process, so it is likely 
that the EU’s socialization process would only increase Croatia’s willingness to work closely 
with its neighbors and support those that are still interested in joining the club.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
On July 1 2013 Croatia became the 28th member state of the European Union. Croatia is 
the second state of the former Yugoslavia to enter the EU, after Slovenia’s entry in 2009, and the 
first state that was significantly affected by the Yugoslav wars. The acceptance of the newest 
member state by “Old Europe” is a telling sign of how quickly politics can change in the modern 
world. Furthermore, the fact that Croatia was in a state of war less than two decades ago would 
seem to suggest the country’s dedication to a swift reform process. 
As a result of Croatia’s progress, the EU has placed tremendous pressure on Croatia to 
support its Balkan neighbors to implement similar reforms. Brussels wants Croatia to act as a 
leader in the region and use its own experience to support the Europeanization process. The EU 
does not want to see Croatia act as Slovenia did during Croatia’s own accession process, when 
Slovenia blocked its neighbor’s accession to force an agreement on a long-running dispute. Thus, 
while working toward membership amid a crisis, Croatia’s main thorn in its side was not just the 
financial constraints but also the hostility of its neighbors. In addition to the Slovenia obstacle, 
Croatia faced the challenge of building relations with former enemies with whom 
communication was either minimal or nonexistent. With regional cooperation as a condition for 
membership, Croatia had to prove to Brussels it could earn Slovenia’s approval while also 
appeasing the other post-Yugoslav states and assisting their transformation. 
The importance of the EU’s post-conflict attempt to stabilize and democratize the 
Balkans cannot be overstated. Despite Central Europe’s history of meddling in the Western
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 Balkans, the bloody wars of the 90s provoked but trivial efforts by the EU. Europe’s 
failures during this period attest to its weak security policy at the time; despite the EU’s role as a 
peace promoter, a role it has ascribed to itself, member states failed to prevent and manage 
conflicts in their own backyard. If Europe’s guilt for standing by through most of the conflicts is 
not enough of a reason to help the Balkans now, its reputation certainly is. The EU’s reputation 
depends on its ability to guide the region towards not only lasting peace but close cooperation. 
At a time when many doubt the value of the EU due to its financial and economic problems, the 
union could really use this boost. As a result, the EU has placed an enormous amount of pressure 
on Croatia to encourage the efforts of other Balkan states towards European integration. Croatia, 
as the Western Balkans’ most advanced country and the first EU member state to have been 
seriously affected by the Yugoslav wars, has been forced into the role of a regional leader. 
Croatia’s rigorous accession process, far more difficult than that of Slovenia or any other 
member state, should ideally prove to the region that membership is possible when committed to 
reform. If the EU succeeds in spreading optimism through the Balkans by way of Croatian 
accession, it could enhance Brussels’ credibility as a peace promoter and democratizer.   
Considering the pressure Croatia faced, it is worth analyzing how Croatia attempted to 
repair relations with its closest neighbors. It seems probable that Croatia would have been 
reluctant to do much in the region during its first years of independence, especially considering 
the tradition of hostility with Serbia and the interest in supporting the Croat minority in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. It is more likely that Croatia made meaningful attempts towards regional 
cooperation as it moved closer to the EU, with a particular interest in improving relations with 
Slovenia since this was the only former Yugoslav state with the power to block its accession.  
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To address the question of how Croatia proved its potential to act as a “regional leader”, I 
will compare the stated foreign policy goals of Croatia with the attempts of the country’s 
political leaders to engage with their counterparts in the region. This requires me to first suggest 
a theoretical model for understanding Croatia’s interests, motivation, and self-perception. I will 
then offer a general background of the development of foreign policy goals in the new state of 
Croatia. Next, it is necessary to define which matters would have the largest effect on leaders’ 
attempt to build regional relations, specifically which matters would likely serves as the greatest 
challenges. Lastly, I will look at the efforts made by Croatia to build close regional relations and 
analyze the success these efforts had  
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CHAPTER 2: MOTIVATION FOR A REGIONAL POLICY, THE ISSUES OF 
IDENTITY, AND HISTORICAL NARRATIVES 
 
This section is dedicated to an overview of three theories of international relations: 
rationalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, and constructivism. Each theory focuses on different 
aspects of international relations; as a result, each one suggests a different rationale for Croatia’s 
motivation for EU integration and thus meeting the most difficult EU condition: regional 
cooperation and reconciliation.  
Rationalism 
Rationalism states that actors are always self-interested. The theory is based heavily on 
cost/benefit calculations, material incentives, and coercion. From this perspective, actors look to 
join an international organization for its perceived benefits and do not experience any 
fundamental change in interests or values as a result of joining. According to the widely cited 
Jeffrey T. Checkel, “even in those instances where [rationalist] analysts see interests as changing, 
they argue that change occurs slowly and as a function of the new incentive structures agents 
face” (2001, p. 556). 
 When applying rationalism to the Croatian case, it is easy to understand how a simple 
cost/benefit calculation of the necessary reforms against perceived benefits would have spurred 
interest in the EU immediately after independence. While NATO offered a security guarantee 
that Croatia desperately wanted following its war for independence, the EU offered the economic
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 solution, promising millions of euros in assistance programs and pre-accession funds; however, 
Croatia retrieved less than half of the total pre-accession funds available to it, suggesting it did   
not fully take advantage of the material incentives for accession. Also, while EU accession made 
sense for Croatia in 2000, rationalism cannot explain why it would have made sense after the 
financial crisis. Croatia endured the most difficult accession process to date and didn’t lose steam 
despite the crisis; in fact, the government’s rhetoric and implementation of reforms indicate 
Croatia was working most diligently towards meeting EU standards after the crisis peaked. The 
EU’s response to the crisis promised to be especially damaging to Croatia’s economy; for 
example, the new emphasis on public debt reduction with the EU’s excessive deficit procedure 
would pose a significant challenge to Croatia in the midst of its recession. 
If rationalism doesn’t fully explain Croatia’s motivation for membership, it also doesn’t 
fully explain Croatia’s motivation to meet the conditions for membership. Rationalists would 
argue that norms are not internalized by elites but merely constrain their behavior (Checkel, 
2001, p. 557). This would suggest that in repairing relations with its neighbors, the Croatian 
government merely adhered to a goal dictated to them and followed the EU-approved ways of 
doing so. However, this doesn’t offer a full explanation in scenarios where Croatia went above 
and beyond the requirements such as offering an official apology to Bosnia and Herzegovina for 
war crimes committed by the state of Croatia. It simply does not seem logical for Croatia to 
make such bold moves to satisfy EU demands for good regional relations when it did not even 
fully absorb the EU’s greatest incentive, the pre-accession funds, and its economic prospect was 
bleak. Rationalism cannot be entirely discounted but, for the purpose of this paper, rationalism 
will most likely only assist in explaining Croatia’s initial developments and will not guide the 
understanding of Croatia post-crisis. Considering material incentives do not sufficiently explain 
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the situation, it is worth considering domestic pressure through the liberal intergovernmentalist 
lens. 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism  
Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism, while encompassing some parts of 
rationalist ideology, strives to explain EU integration by underlining “rational state behaviour in 
terms of optimizing economic benefits, through an asymmetric bargaining process, with state 
preferences shaped by domestic societal pressures” (Miosic-Lisjak, 2006, p. 101). This theory, 
with its emphasis on national preference formation, does not consider the importance of external 
pressures on national governments. Liberal intergovernmentalism expects governments to 
respond primarily to domestic pressure. According to this logic, there is no reason why Croatia 
should have cooperated with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) in handing over indicted war criminals seen as heroes by the Croatian public. Although 
Croatia was hesitant to cooperate with the ICTY, it eventually came around to giving up the 
nation’s beloved war hero, Ante Gotovina. The Croatian government dragged its feet on the issue 
for some time but eventually responded to EU pressure to cooperate in finding Gotovina, proving 
both domestic and external pressures have influence. Croatia was “neither at the centre nor is it 
in control of the negotiation process” with the EU. This theory leaves out the important role of 
the EU in shaping individual states’ values and preferences. 
 While the Croatian government had to take into account the views of its citizenry, much 
of its foreign policy formation was a response to the conditions of accession (Miosic-Lisjak, 
2006, p. 111). Liberal intergovernmentalism may prove useful when analyzing examples of 
Croatia’s reluctance to comply with EU demands; however, former Croatian governments have 
had to respond to more than just domestic pressure when formulating foreign policy and 
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therefore it is important to consider the interplay between the EU, Croatia, and its own 
understanding of its values and its future role. Constructivist theory could surely fill some of the 
gaps that liberal intergovernmentalism and rationalism leave. 
Constructivism  
Social constructivism states that “social construction”, the institutions and norms around 
which society is organized, are what actors base their preferences on (McNamara, 2010, p. 161). 
This social reality must be rooted in a value system and once actors adopt these values, they 
make certain decisions because they are seen as legitimate and agree with their internalized 
identities. Social constructivism also emphasizes the “mutual constitutiveness” of the social 
order which means the creators of the regulatory environment, those actors that originally set the 
norms, are constantly redefining themselves and re-envisioning their role in the world based on 
their stated values (Diez and Wiener, 2009, p. 48). 
When applying the constructivist framework to a state’s foreign policy formation, the 
assumption is that the state’s identity is the most important factor. This seems very true when 
looking at Croatian rhetoric for EU integration which used “Europe” and “the EU” 
interchangeably. From Croatia’s point of view, it must be a part of the EU to once again establish 
itself as a true European state. This is important for Croatia as its chosen identity is much more 
Western European that it is Balkan. Like the Eastern European states of the 2004 and 2007 
enlargements, Croatian elites constantly spoke of their “return to Europe”. As early as 2000, the 
Croatian Parliament’s Declaration on the Homeland War asserted Croatia was ready for real 
reform “as a country which shares the democratic values of the present western world . . .  in the 
domains of politics, security, society and culture” (as cited in Horelt and Renner, 2008, p. 14). 
The former prime minister Iva Racan even presented a document titled “RE:member Croatia” 
 8 
 
when applying for candidacy in 2003 (Miosic-Lisjak, 2006, p. 110). The interesting title suggests 
that Croatia strived for its place in the EU to once again be a part of the western world. Ines 
Sabalic, a Croatian journalist in Brussels, also confirms this sentiment when she insists that 
“Croats have always argued that they are part of Europe, not the Balkans” (“A cautious yes; 
Croatia and the European Union,” 2012). 
The Complexity of the Croatian Identity 
Although Croatian elites have clearly preferred to think of themselves as part of the West, 
this is only one aspect of a very complex identity. Croatia’s shared history with states it 
considers more “Balkan” that itself, as well as the way the Yugoslav Wars played out, have had 
implications for the Croatian historical narrative. The historical narrative, or the way Croatians 
interpret their past, is essential to its identity construction. Horelt and Renner explore four 
observable identity patterns that emerged after Croatia’s wars of independence. The four ways 
Croatia can see itself is as a heroic nation that courageously stood up to Serbian aggression, as an 
innocent nation with a few bad war criminals, as a Western nation that adheres to democratic 
values, and as a Balkan nation with the expected criminal habit (2008, p. 9). These identities 
exist simultaneously, sometimes overlap, and compete with each other so one or the other might 
gain dominance at certain points in time. As constructivism posits, the identity of Croatia is the 
main factor for explaining its foreign policy; therefore, Croatia’s numerous identities all suggest 
different policy options. The way these four identities relate is relevant for understanding what 
could be a schizophrenic regional policy, sometimes complying with EU mandates and 
sometimes not. By analyzing Croatian rhetoric and actions towards its neighbors, it is possible to 
answer which historical narrative has come out most successful. 
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In conclusion, rationalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, and constructivism all suggest 
different ways of understanding Croatian foreign policy at various points in history. The 
intersection of these three schools of thought, with an added emphasis on constructivism and the 
Croatian identity, can help explain Croatia’s motivation for an active regional policy. When 
Croatia initially started its reform process in hopes of EU membership, the new state could 
indeed see a prosperous future for itself and rationalist theory would easily explain why Croatia 
desired membership. However, when the probability of economic success changed for the worse, 
Croatia did not hesitate in its pursuit but rather increased the pace. Furthermore, the Croatian 
government may have responded to its citizens’ concerns at times, but it implemented difficult 
reforms and pursued a foreign policy that appeared unpopular domestically. Croatian elites might 
have looked inward at times but they often decided, for their country’s future, to respond to EU 
pressure and do what was unpopular at home. The identity explanation is more substantial for 
understanding Croatian governments’ enthusiasm in recent years. Therefore, constructivist 
theory helps scholars understand why Croatia is now conducting relations with those it fought 
only two decades ago. Constructivism would suggest that it underwent serious socialization, 
adopted new norms, and altered its historical narrative. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE EVOLUTION OF CROATIA’S FOREIGN POLICY GOALS 
Ivo Josipovic, the third president of Croatia since 2010, delivered a lecture at the South 
Eastern European Studies Centre at Oxford on May 24, 2013 in which he outlined Croatia’s 
foreign policy objectives since 1992. The first objective was international recognition of the 
country and then, second, to establish its territorial integrity. Once Croatia accomplished both of 
these objectives, the next goal was to join the international community through membership in 
NATO and the EU. Josipovic, delivering this lecture just five weeks before Croatia’s entry into 
the EU, expressed his desire for further enlargement to his neighbors in the Western Balkans. In 
his concluding remarks, he promised Croatia would be at the disposal of all its neighbors in 
achieving the goals of Europeanization and reform.  
Croatia’s stated foreign policy goals over time have generally followed Josipovic’s 
narrative (The Republic of Croatia’s Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs). Immediately 
after the Croatian War of Independence, the new state’s foreign policy was initially characterized 
by regional disengagement (Trkanjec, 2010). The situation looked as if it would change in 2000 
when the country elected Stjepan Mesic as president and a Social Democratic Party (SDP) 
government, formed under Prime Minister Ivica Racan. Although this government focused 
primarily on domestic issues rather than improving regional relations, it made some steps toward 
joining the international community with its admittance to NATO’s Partnership for Peace and 
the WTO by July of 2000. 
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In 2003, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) came to government under the leadership 
of Ivo Sanader.  Sanader set his main foreign policy goals as membership to NATO and the EU. 
To advance towards achieving these goals, Sanader fixed Croatia’s cooperation issue with The 
Hague tribunal and initiated EU membership talks (Sanader 2005). Sanader largely succeeded in 
his goals as Croatia was granted official candidate status by June of 2004 and joined NATO in 
April of 2009; still, he failed to push for an active regional policy. 
After NATO accession under Sanader, Jadranka Kosor became prime minister. Under her 
leadership, and with Ivo Josipovic’s presidency starting in 2010, Croatia conducted a more 
determined foreign policy. These influential politicians focused even more on EU integration and 
regional cooperation than their predecessors. In 2011, the newly elected president Josipovic said 
Croatia’s new “regional policy is part of the European policy” (“Croatia's ‘serious foreign 
policy’ focused on EU, region in 2010,” 2010). The president expressed his intent to make his 
country a leader in the region, exactly what the EU had been waiting for. 
After the EU finally confirmed Croatia had met the requirements for membership, the 
country signed the EU accession treaty in 2011 (Castle, 2011). In January of 2012 the Croatian 
public approved EU membership in a referendum and membership was ratified on July 1, 2013 
making Croatia the newest member of the EU (Bilefsky, 2013). The EU has continued to push 
Croatia to act as a regional leader since accession, but there have been and continue to be real 
challenges to this. 
Challenges for Regional Relations 
A number of issues have likely complicated the country’s willingness to engage in an 
active regional policy which requires building relations with former enemies. The main 
challenges are those related to issues of legacy and identity. 
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 Legacy issues in the Balkans have historical roots much older than the Yugoslav Wars of 
the 90s, but for the purpose of this paper, the focus will be limited to the breakup of Yugoslavia 
up until Croatian accession. Croatia’s main legacy issues, resulting from a history of war, are 
with some of its direct neighbors: Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Montenegro is also a state 
to consider as it assisted Serbian aggression during the 90s. How Croatia works with Kosovo 
may also be important as it would antagonize Serbia. However, even Slovenia is important to 
consider as it is the only other EU member state that was a part of the former Yugoslavia. 
While Slovenians and Croatians never fought in the 90s, Slovenia has acted as a major 
obstacle to Croatian EU accession. Slovenia blocked Croatia’s accession twice, forcing its 
neighbor to surrender over disputes about border and banking issues that have existed since the 
breakup of Yugoslavia. Croatia’s EU bid likely depended on its ability to “jump through hoops” 
place by Slovenia. 
Serbia is the country with which Croatia has the most lingering hostility. Serbia receives 
the most blame for war crimes while Croatia has traditionally been hesitant to acknowledge 
wrongdoings on its own side. This tension has led to a number of arguments both rhetorically, 
with politicians making snippy comments back and forth, and more formally, through genocide 
lawsuits before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Another issue for Croatian-Serbian 
relations is Serbia’s refusal to participate in events that embrace Kosovo, since Croatia 
recognized the self-proclaimed state early on and aims to engage Kosovo in regional initiatives 
as supported by the EU. While Croatia succeeds in putting its relations with Kosovo on a 
productive track, it may be at the expense of its relations with Serbia, which are already messy. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina could also be a difficult neighbor for Croatia to work with 
considering it was the main victim of Croatian aggression outside of Croatian territory. Croatia’s 
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cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has been pushed 
by the EU as an important step towards reconciliation for these crimes in Bosnia. Also, both 
countries share their longest border with one another and this is likely to cause significant border 
issues.  
 History would also suggest that the Croatian-Montenegrin relationship could be an issue 
considering Montenegro was a strong Serbian ally during the Yugoslav wars. Montenegrin 
forces were responsible for substantial destruction of Dubrovnik, a historic port city in Southern 
Croatia along the Montenegrin border. Croatian-Montenegrin relations largely depends on 
Croatia’s view of Montenegro, whether it blames its neighbor for aggression inside its territory 
as it does for Serbia, and whether Montenegro can also confront its past and acknowledge such 
wrongdoings. 
Many of the issues mentioned, such as border disputes and cooperation with The Hague 
can be dealt with diplomatically, yet one matter that cannot be easily changed is the question of 
the Croatian identity. A common perception Croatians have is that, despite the shared history, 
they have less in common with the Balkans than with Central or Western Europe. Due to some 
cultural commonalties with the West, for example the Catholic tradition, Croatians see 
themselves as very distinct from its immediate neighbors. Even amid the EU financial crisis, the 
Croatian government sold EU membership to the public based on rhetoric on national identity 
and its place with the West rather than economic benefits. The pro-EU rhetoric about identity 
resonated with the public as Croatians are in the midst of what Alex Crevar calls an “identity 
crisis.” He insists that despite Croatia’s geographic position in the Balkan Peninsula, “call a chic 
Zagrebian Balkan and prepare to get an earful” (2009). Ines Sabalic, a Croatian journalist in 
Brussels, also confirms this sentiment when she insists that “Croats have always argued that they 
 14 
 
are part of Europe, not the Balkans (“A cautious yes; Croatia and the European Union,” 2012). 
With this understanding of being entirely different from its neighbors, what motivation does 
Croatia have to reach out to them? The EU seems to be responsible for much of this pressure as 
it forces Croatia to not only deal with war criminals through cooperation with The Hague but 
also to act as a leader for other Balkan states. 
Croatia’s entry into the EU assures the rest of the Balkans that membership is within 
reach as long as the countries are willing to undergo serious reform.  EU officials depend on 
Croatia to prove this to its Balkan neighbors as much as the Balkan states depend on Croatia to 
ensure further enlargement. Most analysts agree that hindsight has shown that Romania and 
Bulgaria’s admission in 2007 was premature; thus, the enthusiasm for enlargement is quite weak 
at the moment. Dimitar Bechev, senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign 
Relations, maintains that “if Croatia is seen as a success it can bolster enlargement” (Castle, 
2013). Dan Bilefsky, a correspondent for the New York Times with expertise in the Balkans,  
agrees and takes the notion a step further with the belief that “if Croatia turns into a problem 
child for the E.U., then it's going to be next to impossible for anyone else to join” (2013). 
Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, and Macedonia are all hoping to join the 
EU. Kosovo and Serbia have made great strides in proving to Brussels that they are ready to join, 
even signing an agreement to overcome ethnic hostilities that led to Serbia receiving permission 
to start EU negotiations in 2014 and Kosovo gaining closer trade, economic and political 
relations. However, the possibility of disputes reemerging within the region cannot be ruled out 
and without Croatia’s superb behavior as a new member and its support of its neighbors, the 
Balkan region could face long-term marginalization  
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CHAPTER 4: FOREIGN POLICY IN ACTION 
Slovenia 
For Croatia’s NATO and EU accession processes, it desperately relied on Slovenia as an 
ally. Slovenia has been a member of both NATO and the EU since 2004 and thus Croatia had to 
earn Slovenian approval to enter both organizations. This gave momentum to Croatian-Slovenian 
relations, although quite obviously Slovenia negotiated from a position of strength. 
During the early 2000s, Croatia’s failure to form an active regional policy caused relations with 
Slovenia to take a turn for the worst, but Croatia had to overcome this if it wanted membership in 
both organizations. 
Slovenia first utilized its power to obstruct Croatian transatlantic integration in 2008 
when it blocked its entry to NATO, citing a border dispute. The disagreement is over a part of 
the Adriatic Sea left unmarked after the breakup of Yugoslavia. This particular issue has been 
one of the largest obstacles in repairing Croatian-Slovenian relations. In 2009 Slovenian 
nationalists even tried to force a referendum to once again block Croatia’s accession to NATO. 
The party attempted to collect the 40,000 signatories required for a referendum but failed, 
permitting Croatia’s admission to NATO (Reuters 2009). 
Slovenia also exerted its power vis-à-vis Croatia by blocking its accession to the EU. 
After Slovenia voted against the Croatian accession process in 2009, Sanader stepped down as 
Prime Minister (Trkanjec, 2010). That year, Croatian Prime Minister Kosor proved her 
dedication to the accession process by working closely with her Slovenian counterpart to resolve
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 their border dispute. The ratification of the border deal removed one of the main 
obstacles for Croatia’s entry (The Associated Press, 2009). 
Croatian-Slovenian relations improved after the border resolution in the late 2000s, but 
this reality was threatened in 2012 when an ongoing issue of Yugoslav-era foreign currency 
deposits came to the forefront of relations. Ljubljanska Banka (LB), a Slovenian entity, went 
bankrupt in the early 90s and its foreign currency deposits became Croatia’s public debt and paid 
out to LB clients. The problem arose when the Croatian government authorized two private 
Croatian banks to sue LB (“LB issue dominate Slovenia-Croatia relations,” 2013). Croatia 
brought the first-ever European Human Rights Court ruling against Slovenia regarding this 
matter and Slovenia demanded that Croatia withdraw its authorization for the lawsuits. Once 
again, Slovenia used its power as an EU member state to force Croatia to yield in an ongoing 
dispute by making this a condition for the Slovenian Parliament’s ratification of Croatia's EU 
Accession Treaty. Just like in the border dispute, Slovenia was successful. In March of 2013, the 
EU Commission announced that the two made a deal regarding the issue and thus Croatia no 
longer faced any opposition to membership (The EU Commission, 2013). 
Despite having to surrender to Slovenia over long-running disputes, Croatia had an easier 
time cooperating with its neighbor on issues of broader regional importance. Responding to 
Brussels’ demands to act as a regional leader, Croatia has committed to working especially 
closely with Slovenia in regional initiatives. The best example of this effort is the Brdo Process, 
a collaboration between the two to assist their neighbors’ efforts towards transatlantic 
integration. Croatian and Slovenian prime ministers first decided to commit to this task during a 
meeting in January of 2010. Two months later, Croatia and Slovenia initiated the program at a 
conference in Brdo kod Kranja, a town in the Northwest of Slovenia, giving the process its name 
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(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia). This kind of cooperation between 
Croatia and Slovenia was unimaginable a few years before, proving Kosor and Josipovic’s 
determination to make a reliable ally out of Slovenia and promote transatlanticism in the region 
to prove to Brussels it was assuming its role as a regional leader. Furthermore, the Croatian-
Slovenian partnership on the Brdo Process has been very successful in its goal to motivate other 
Balkan states towards reform in hopes of European integration. French President Francois 
Hollande even attended the 2013 meeting in Brdo to demonstrate his support for the Balkans’ 
EU integration process (Bandic, 2013). 
Although Croatia was forced to succumb to Slovenian pressure over bilateral issues in 
hopes of both NATO and EU integration, the two are now working as equal members of 
transatlantic organizations to coordinate support for others aspiring to follow their lead. From the 
rationalist perspective, Croatia was coerced into reaching less-than-favorable agreements with 
Slovenia as it desired membership in both organizations. The constructivist ideology seems more 
relevant for the development of relations in previous years, however, as it suggests that Croatian 
elites have been socialized to at least try out their role as a regional leader, with Slovenia 
assisting. Through efforts like the Brdo Process, the two countries are now working as equals to 
build regional solidarity and encourage Balkan states to seek membership in Euro-Atlantic 
organizations. In effect, Croatia’s entry to the EU has meant another actor responsible for leading 
the Balkans in the direction of Brussels. 
Serbia 
While Slovenia’s prior acceptance by the West forced Croatian submission, Croatia’s 
relations with Serbia is a different story entirely. Croatians still see Serbia as an aggressor 
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responsible for major destruction in its region, yet the state of Croatia has been pressured by the 
EU to help reform Serbia into a modern European state. 
The Croatian-Serbian relationship was not any better in the first years of peace than 
before. Tudjman had no interest in working towards making Serbia an ally but even after his 
death, the reality did not change much. Mesic’s government in the early 2000s claimed it would 
develop relations with its immediate neighbors, including Serbia, but it made little effort to do so 
because of the Croatian public’s strong opposition. At the time, Croatian voters still clung to the 
past and therefore so did their government. Subsequent governments have attempted to repair 
relations with Serbia in aspiration of EU membership, and Serbia also had an interest as it 
wanted to initiate accession talks (Marini, 2013). Still, the countries face many difficulties 
considering how recent the war was. The main challenges have been related to unresolved war 
crimes, Serbia’s anger with the ICTY acquittal process, the refugee situation, and Croatian 
support of Kosovo. 
A legal war between Croatia and Serbia began in 1999 when Croatia filed a lawsuit 
against Serbia in the ICJ for the murders of Croats. In 2009, after years of Serbia trying to 
convince Croatia to withdraw the suit, Serbia filed a countersuit against Croatia (Ristic, 2013). 
Throughout 2011, Josipovic and his Serbian counterpart Tadic met many times to discuss issues 
like this that hinder bilateral cooperation. The blossoming of this relationship quickly came to a 
halt, though, in November of 2012 when Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markac, two Croatian 
generals, were acquitted of war crimes against Serbs. While the Croatians have responded 
joyfully, Serbs are outraged. This even led to a victory of nationalists in Serbia, electing 
Tomislav Nikolic, a former extreme nationalist, as president and Ivica Dacic, Milosevic’s former 
spokesperson, as prime minister (T.J., 2012). Nikolic consistently refused Josipovic’s proposals 
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for meetings because of his stark opposition to the acquittal of these generals. He made very 
offensive statements, even saying Croats may not return to the Croatian town of Vukovar, a town 
practically destroyed by Serbian forces in 1991, because it belongs to Serbia (Judah, “How 
Croatia and Serbia buried the hatch”). 
Contrary to Nikolic’s statement, Croatia has greatly improved its refugee situation. 
Especially under Kosor, the Croatian government made its refugee policy and resettlement of its 
minority Serbs a higher priority. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
acknowledged Croatia’s achievements in March of 2010 while recommending further steps. Still, 
at this time, Croatia had already reconstructed over 50,000 houses for Serb returnees and even 
more improvements have been made since then (UNHCR, p. 3). Many Serbian politicians and 
NGOs point to the low number of Serb returnees to Croatia as proof that the state has not done 
enough, but the UNHCR and the U.S. government have recognized Croatia’s refugee situation as 
the best in the region. Despite tremendous support for returnees, the fact is that many Serbs have 
no interest in returning and while the Croatian government can offer incentives for refugees to 
return, it cannot force them to do so. Still, the Serbian government uses this as a point for 
argument and it is considerably difficult strain on relations. 
Another issue that Croatia and Serbia have consistently fought over is Kosovo. Since 
2008, Croatia has recognized Kosovo and included it in regional efforts despite Serbian 
governments’ refusal to recognize it or participate in events where Kosovar officials are present. 
This has become a major challenge for building peaceful relations. Possibly the biggest step 
Croatia has taken in establishing its role as a regional leader is the establishment of its annual 
summit. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, Croatia hosted a conference in 
2006 focused on the “Future of Southeast Europe.” The Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
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invited its neighbors to Dubrovnik to discuss issues relevant for the region’s future. The event 
concluded with a joint declaration emphasizing the attendee’s commitment to membership of 
NATO and the EU. The conference has been repeated every year based on relevant themes, such 
as in 2012 when it was organized for Croatia to share its EU accession experience with its 
neighbors (Jovanovic, 2013). Serbia has consistently refused to attend in protest of Kosovo’s 
participation (“Serbia boycotts Croatia Summit over Kosovo,” 2012). Serbian officials have even 
skipped out on less political events such as President Josipovic’s inauguration in 2010. Josipovic 
invited the Serbian President Tadic but he turned him down because Kosovar President Fatmir 
Sejdiu was invited too. (Trkanjec, 2010).  
As mentioned earlier, Croatia and Slovenia have led the Brdo Process since 2010 to 
promote coordination on regional efforts towards Euro-Atlantic integration. Further confirming 
good relations between Croatia and Slovenia, the two have worked together to encourage Serbia 
to participate in Brdo events along with Kosovo. Three-way talks began under Prime Minister 
Kosor in 2010 when she met her Slovenian and Serbian counterparts to discuss the upcoming 
conference. The main obstacle of the conference’s success was, and continues to be, Serbia’s 
reluctance to attend due to Kosovo’s presence.  For the first conference on March 20 2010, 
Serbia insisted that Kosovo attend the conference as Kosovo-UNMIK (United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission) (“Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia to continue three-way talks,” 2010). No 
compromise was met and Serbia refused to attend; still, the event has been repeated annually and 
Serbia actually showed at the most recent meeting on July 25 2013 just three months after 
reaching a landmark deal with Kosovo. The two reached an important deal over the future of the 
Serb-run region in Northern Kosovo (Barlovac, 2013). They also agreed not to block each 
other’s’ path towards EU integration. This agreement has paved the way for future discussion 
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between Serbia and Kosovo, making their mutual attendance possible at important political 
events. Even French President Francois Hollande attended the 2013 conference to demonstrate 
his support for the Balkans’ EU integration process (Bandic, 2013). 
Josipovic has also made his own personal attempts at improving his relationship with 
Nikolic, having resumed regular communication over the past year. The Croatian president even 
visited Nikolic in Belgrade in October of 2013, marking the first time he visited Serbia since his 
election. Still, the two have not been able to reach an agreement regarding their lawsuits against 
each other. Nikolic promises to drop its genocide suit if Croatia drops its own, yet Josipovic 
refuses to do so until the issues of missing Croats is addressed. An estimated 1,689 people have 
still not been accounted for, 953 Croats and 736 Serbs (Marini, 2013). This is an issue that 
Croatia is unlikely to budge on, even under future governments and presidents.  
Croatian interest in relations with Serbia cannot be supported by rationalist theory, with 
its focus on cost-benefit analysis, and even less so by the liberal intergovernmentalist 
perspective, with its focus on domestic opinion. Many Croatian citizens are still wary of 
Serbians, sometimes not so subtly and actually more hatful than wary. This is a perfect recipe to 
continue a passive aggressive foreign policy towards Serbia yet this was not a viable option for a 
state which sees its future in Europe. It would be overly optimistic to assume all Croatian elites 
have radically transformed from their nationalist past and now welcome their Serbian 
counterparts with open arms; however, some key figures in Croatian politics have obviously 
managed to take the first steps in improving Croatia’s future with its former enemy. All things 
considered, this seems to be a one-sided effort as Serbia has been largely unresponsive to 
Croatia’s attempts to strengthen relations. The two still have disputes stemming from their 
nationalist pasts and fundamental identity issues, but the Serbian government’s desire for EU 
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membership may have a positive effect on its willingness to, at the very least, maintain normal 
communication with Croatia. With Croatia’s accession, it is even more necessary for Nikolic to 
respond to his counterpart since he needs Croatia to not obstruct his country’s accession process. 
Croatia’s relations with Kosovo and Serbia’s obstinacy regarding this have also complicated 
things; however, the situation has improved since a Serbia-Kosovo agreement made in April of 
2013. At this time, Serbian EU Integration Office Director Milan Pajevic expressed approval of 
Croatia’s stance, saying his Croatian counterparts are very motivated to help Serbia and that "on 
the working level, relations are just fantastic” (Judah, “How Croatia and Serbia buried the 
hatch”). 
Kosovo 
The most influential western nations, including the US and major European powers, were 
the first to recognize Kosovo when it unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in February 
of 2008. Croatia’s recognition of Kosovo was sure to worsen relations with Serbia, a relationship 
Croatia intends to repair. Despite the risk, Croatia recognized Kosovo in March of 2008. This 
swift recognition as well as Croatia’s support for Kosovo’s independence before the ICJ, its 
inclusion of Kosovo in regional initiatives, and public statements of support are Croatia’s main 
ways of guiding Kosovo towards Europeanization. 
Croatia recognized Kosovo in March of 2008. The timing of this was likely strategic, as 
Croatia was hoping to join NATO by 2010 and was expected to receive an invitation the 
following month at the NATO summit in Bucharest (which it did). The Croatian government 
organized a session with the governments of Hungary and Bulgaria to adopt a joint statement. 
The statement was critical of the failed efforts of the international community to reach a solution 
between Belgrade and Pristina, endorsed Kosovar institutions in their commitment to human 
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rights, and connected the integrity of Kosovo to stability in the region (Government of the 
Republic of Croatia). As three states which border Serbian and have significant influence in the 
region, the statement was a powerful response to Kosovo’s declaration. 
Croatia’s testimony before the ICJ was possibly the most notable example of its support 
for Kosovo’s integrity. Serbia filed a request for the ICJ opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence in August of 2008. When the case came before the ICJ in December of 2009, 
Serbia and Kosovo presented their arguments followed by the opinions of 27 states. Croatia was 
the only former Yugoslav state to participate, proving it was more readily willing to back 
Kosovo than its immediate neighbors. Croatia was represented by four officials including 
Andreja Metelko-Zgombic, the Chief Legal Advisor for the MFA, who delivered the state of 
Croatia’s official testimony. Metelko-Zgombic argued that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of 
independence was in accordance with international law and that Kosovo had the same right to 
self-determination as the other former members of Yugoslavia. She cited the factors that led to 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence, focusing on human rights abuses carried out on behalf of 
the Serbian state. Metelko-Zgmobic’s powerful argument led to the ICJ advisory opinion in July 
of 2010 stating that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence was indeed not in violation 
of international law (ICJ). As the only member of the Former Yugoslavia to testify on the matter, 
Croatia played an important role in this ruling, strengthening the Croatia-Kosovo relationship. 
In addition to its unwavering supporting for Kosovo’s integrity, Croatia consistently 
includes Kosovo in regional events despite Serbia’s objection. Josipovic invited Kosovar 
officials to his inauguration despite knowing this could threaten any success made in relations 
with Serbia (Trkanjec, 2010). Croatia also extended invitations to Kosovo for regional 
conferences such as the annual Croatia Summit. Although the Serbians in power refused to 
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attend the conference in 2012, former Serbian President Boris Tadic came as a personal guest of 
the Croatian prime minister. At the event, Tadic even shook Kosovar Prime Minister Hashim 
Thaci’s hand. Serbia’s former ambassador to Germany agreed that events such as this could 
further enable interaction between the two and improve their relations (Jovanovic, 2012). By not 
waning in its support of Kosovo, Croatia is forcing a reality on Serbia that it is closer to 
accepting. 
 The final form of public support Croatia demonstrates for Kosovo is through amicable 
speech, and former Croatian Prime Minister Kosor’s statements serve as the best example. 
During a trip to Pristina, Kosor made the bold statement that Kosovo was her country’s “best 
friend because both countries suffered from the nationalist and war-making regime of late 
Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic in the 1990s” (Dervisbegovic, 2014). Croatia has made great 
effort to publicly support Kosovo in public statements and by including it in regional initiatives 
to support states’ eventual European integration; the most effective example may be the delivery 
Croatia’s opinion at the public hearing of the ICJ ruling on Kosovo’s independence. In the run up 
to Croatia’s entry to the EU, it proved that it will use its voice and power to support Kosovo’s 
ambitions as a true European state.  
 Since Kosovo’s declaration of independence, Croatia has proven to be one of its closest 
allies, yet Croatia’s unwavering support of the controversial state does not fit neatly into a single 
theoretical framework. Rationalist theory applies well in the event of the Croatian government’s 
timely recognition of Kosovo, right before a NATO summit at which it expected to receive 
invitation for membership. Croatia’s incentive for this first step, to join the West’s security 
alliance, was tangible and immediate; there were no tangible or immediate rewards, however, for 
arguing for Kosovo’s independence before the ICJ or including Kosovo in regional initiatives 
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despite the strain this put on Croatian-Serbian relations. When considering the identity element 
of constructivist theory, it is much easier to comprehend Croatia’s relentless support of Kosovo. 
The concept of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” perfectly describes the foundation of 
these relations, as Croatian politicians have related Kosovo’s struggle for independence to 
Croatia’s own. If Serbia was the enemy aggressor in both nations’ historical narratives, the two 
have some common understanding (Thorpe, 2008). While this is a likely friendship considering 
the two countries’ common adversary, the dynamics also help Croatia fulfill its obligation to lead 
the region towards reform. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 While Croatia takes issue with Serbia for its aggression in Croatian territory, the story is 
the direct opposite in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatian violence in Bosnia and 
Tudjman’s collaborative effort to divide Bosnian territory with Milosevic are the main examples 
of Croatian war crimes outside of its territory. After the cessation of violence in Croatia, 
Tudjman still did very little to repair his country’s relationship with Bosnia and Herzegovina. He 
continued to support Bosnian Croats, further destabilizing the region even in peaceful times. He 
also refused to pressure Bosnian Croats to comply with the Dayton accords.  In 1998, German 
and French Foreign Ministers went to Zagreb to speak with Tudjman. They warned him that 
Croatia could not develop ties with the EU unless it committed to doing a number of things, 
including supporting peace in Bosnia. Specifically, the foreign ministers warned that Croatia’s 
behavior would prevent it from joining the EU’s assistance program and initiate talks on a 
cooperation treaty (“France and Germany warn Croatia,” 1998). Since then, Croatia has become 
the world’s most vocal supporter of extending EU candidate status to Bosnia, but Croatian 
assistance to its bordering country does not seem to go much further than this. 
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In 2000, the makeup of Croatian elites changed but policy towards Bosnia did not 
undergo as radical a transformation. Racan became prime minister after Tudjman’s death and did 
begin to withdraw support for Bosnian Croats, while newly-elected President Mesic began his 
term with a visit to Bosnia Herzegovina, an indication of his government’s intention to improve 
relations (Knaus, 2012, p. 197). Mesic, however, succumbed to domestic pressure and failed to 
create an active regional policy; thus, Croatian-Bosnian relations remained stagnant (Trkanjec, 
2010). 
More significant changes in Croatian-Bosnian relations began when Ivo Sanader became 
prime minister in 2003. In hopes of pleasing the EU, he further consolidated moves to cut off 
support for Bosnian Croat organizations, sending the message that the state of Bosnia, not 
Croatia, was their home (Judah, “Croatia: From isolation to EU membership”). Sanader also 
began to arrest Bosnian-Croat war criminals, a move that was unthinkable under previous 
governments (Bilefsky, 2013). This effectively allowed his government to start membership 
talks. 
More recently, Josipovic has made stronger statements about the situation in Bosnia. One 
of the most important actions he took towards reconciliation during Croatia’s accession process 
was when visited the Bosnian Parliament in April of 2010 and extended an apology of sorts for 
his country’s attempts to split up Bosnia and the massacres that resulted. The apology was a 
surprise to the Croatian public, but was generally appreciated as it would improve bilateral 
relations. When questioned about the statement, Josipovic said “someone had to take one step 
further," (“Croatia's ‘serious foreign policy’ focused on EU, region in 2010,” 2010). He insisted 
his expression of regret for the past was not done as a response to any order, not by his 
government or the EU. He also was quoted saying that the responsible thing to do for all 
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politicians in the region is to “see both good and bad sides of the policy their country was 
conducting” (Fonet, 2010). This statement was quite revolutionary as it was the first public 
statement of a Croatian official expressing remorse for the Bosniaks affected by Bosnian Croat 
ethnic cleansing. It is remarkable that this occurred over three years before the conviction of key 
members of the Croat leadership (ICTY). 
The main lingering issues in Croatian-Bosnian relations have been related to their large 
common border. Croatian and Bosnian ministers of foreign affairs met with the European 
Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy in the framework of 
Trilateral Ministerial meetings. In June of 2013, the two representatives, with the 
Commissioner’s support, agreed on three treaties concerning border management. In one of the 
treaties, Croatia agreed to grant Bosnia permission to continue using one of its ports despite the 
fact that it would soon become EU territory. This move allows Bosnian exports of agricultural 
products to continue unaffected by Croatia’s accession to the EU, proving that both Croatia and 
the EU are interested in the growth of the Bosnian economy. Furthermore, the Croatian 
representative agreed to set up the necessary structures to allow Bosnian exports to reach 
countries of the EU- including Croatia, its largest trade partner. This is important because the 
Bosnian economy could likely collapse if Croatia ceased close trade with its neighbor. In this 
way, the economic success of Croatia can have a very real effect on Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Fule, 2013). 
 Croatia still has a complicated connection to Bosnia through its Croat population. The 
international community sent a clear message to former Croatian governments to renounce 
control of Bosnian Croats and respect the Dayton Accords arrangement. Croatia’s response to 
this type of coercion and heavy influence was in line with rationalist ideology, but 
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constructivism would stress the likely possibility that Croatia intends to make Bosnia its policy 
niche within the EU. As the only EU member state with a significant influence on Bosnia, 
Croatia could be instrumental in working towards a practical solution for Bosnia’s future. 
Croatia’s change in foreign policy direction can be seen in its shift in focus back on Bosnia to 
work towards reconciliation, economic support, and resolution of almost all bilateral issues. 
Despite this optimistic picture and Croatia’s influence on Bosnia’s future via the EU, Croatia’s 
status as an EU member could also complicate other matters. As many Bosnian Croats have dual 
citizenship, Croatia’s entry to the EU is also a major perk for Bosnian Croats. Croatian 
politicians have acknowledged that this reality could worsen ethnic relations among Bosnians as 
it further exacerbates their inequalities. Also, Croatia is not the only country in the region with 
significant influence in Bosnia- Serbia still has the ability to influence the state of play in Bosnia 
through its Serb minority but also through economic means. For these reasons, Croatia must be 
vigorous in its assistance of the Bosnian reform and integration process, while also advocating 
for durable solutions to the tense situation in Bosnia. 
Montenegro  
Despite the fact that Montenegrin forces allied with Serbia during the Yugoslav wars of 
independence, even destroying much of the historic port city of Dubrovnik, current relations 
between Montenegro and Croatia could not be better (Bilefsky, 2009). Since 2000 when 
Montenegro’s previous prime minister Milo Djukanovic apologized to Croatia for his country’s 
actions in Croatian territory, the two countries have not had any serious conflicts (Judah, “How 
Croatia and Serbia buried the hatch”). Like Croatia, Montenegro was able to reach a “wide 
consensus” on Euro-Atlantic integration (Jovic, p. 175). This consensus has made Montenegro 
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the next state furthest along in its Euro-Atlantic integration process, and Croatia has shown great 
enthusiasm to help.  
In December of 2008, Montenegro submitted its application to the EU. In March of 2009, 
it came before the Council but instead of forwarding it to the Commission as usual, Germany 
(with other states’ support) refused, blocking its application until late 2010 (Mihovilovic, 2010; 
Council of the European Union). Following this unfortunate decision for Montenegro, Croatia 
upped its support for its neighbor. The former Croatian president, Stjepan Mesic, emphasized 
Croatia’s readiness to help Montenegro in its efforts to join both the EU and NATO.  That year, 
Croatia doubled its investment in Montenegro, compared to 2008’s figures, and committed to 
helping to improve Montenegro’s infrastructure in the long-term (“Relations between 
Montenegro and Croatia on rise”). On the surface, this assistance seems likely and the 
relationship seems supportive. After Croatia completed accession negotiations with the EU in 
2011, Montenegrin president Vujanovic was full of congratulatory remarks. He insisted this was 
“a success not just for Croatia but also for the region and for Montenegro as its neighbour, 
because it is certain that Croatia will strongly promote Montenegro's strategic interests,” 
(“Josipovic, Vujanovic: Croatian-Montenegrin relations very good,” 2011). At this time, Croatia 
promised Montenegro, an EU candidate since December of 2010, additional support in its 
candidacy. 
One way Croatia has assisted the Montenegrin accession process to the EU and NATO 
has been by granting access to Croatian translations of EU legislation. On June 13 2012, the 
Croatian Foreign Minister Vesna Pusic and her counterpart signed an agreement on Euro-
Atlantic partnership, directed at Croatian assistance to Montenegro in its reform process. Most 
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notably, the agreement gave Montenegro access to its most recent EU legislation adopted later in 
its accession process (Milosevic, 2013). 
Less closely related to Euro-Atlantic integration, Croatia has been able to collaborate 
with Montenegro on issues of transnational crime, a subject that has been problematic for other 
countries in the region. The two countries’ ministers of justice were able to reach an agreement 
to promote cooperation regarding transnational crime, primarily organized crime and corruption. 
As a result, Croatia and Montenegro can support each other’s efforts in combatting crime and 
establish the framework for mutual enforcement of court decisions (Montenegrin Deputy Prime 
Minister for political system, foreign and interior policy, 2011). 
The only remaining dispute between Croatia and Montenegro is over the Prevlaka 
peninsula. Both have claimed the peninsula since the breakup of Yugoslavia. Still, the unsettled 
boundary issue has not been a major conflict and the two have complied with an interim 
agreement that defines the peninsula as Croatian territory and the surrounding waters as 
Montenegrin since 2002 (Milosevic, 2013). 
Despite past wartime issues, relations between Croatia and Montenegro seem to be very 
amicable. Croatia has demonstrated its willingness to support Montenegro as it seems the next 
most probable EU member. In late 2011, Montenegrin President Filip Vujanovic even said that 
Croatian-Montenegrin relations are "an example that should be followed by the region” 
(“Josipovic, Vujanovic: Croatian-Montenegrin relations very good,” 2011). The Croatian 
government has some practical interest in maintaining good relations with Montenegro, as they 
share a border and have strategic interest in a disputed peninsula, but it does not have any 
obvious incentive to go above and beyond in its attempts. Again, this seemingly “goodwill” of 
Croatian elites to assist their neighbors, such as by sharing Croatia’s own translation of EU 
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documents, further supports the constructivist prediction that Croatia begins to assume a role as a 
regional leader. As the next candidate to meet EU standards in the foreseeable future, 
Montenegro has a good reason to respond to the positive Croatian support.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
Croatia has come a long way in its foreign policy development and is currently the most 
dynamic actor in the Balkan region. The new country’s attempt to engage with both its former 
compatriots and enemies was by all means a great endeavor. Croatia’s initial motivation to repair 
regional relations was most likely in response to international pressure, proven by such actions as 
its surrender to Slovenia over long-running disputes in order to remove the final obstacles to 
NATO and EU integration; however, Croatia seems to have a genuine interest in helping 
neighbors such as Kosovo based on values, supporting its integrity despite the consequences, or 
Montenegro as it helps its ally secure a future in Europe in hopes of another stable partner in the 
region. Croatia’s interest in the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina is less simple, as it is 
concerned with this victim of Croatian aggression and also their largest common border. 
Even in the case of Serbia, Croatia has attempted to work on legacy issues that hit close 
to home, even when this upsets the Croatian public. The problem with the Croatian-Serbian 
relationship today is that whenever Croatia has put forth the effort to work on concrete political 
objectives with Serbia, progress has been interrupted by recurring reminders of their past. The 
challenges in this relationship, related to the nations’ different experiences through numerous 
wars and fundamental differences of identity, are too great to be dealt with in a matter twenty 
years. If Serbia becomes more serious about pursuing EU membership, the two might be able to 
work out lasting differences; however, this would be a discussion between a member and a
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nonmember, and there is no guarantee Croatia will not use its veto power regarding enlargement 
to force serious action from Serbia. 
The EU goal was clearly to socialize Croatia into a regional leader with a positive 
influence on countries with which it shares a tremendous amount of history. Croatia dived into 
foreign policy as a newly independent state, and its initial priorities focused on issues the 
government knew would reap the most benefits and advance its country’s NATO and EU 
accession processes. External pressure and material incentives were real motivators at a point in 
time, but Croatian elites seemed most determined when their country’s economic prospects were 
bleak. In contrast to liberal intergovernmentalist thinking, they made difficult choices that were 
at odds with public opinion. As the socialization emphasis of constructivist theory would have 
suggested, the Croatian government has embraced the role of regional leader and is sharing its 
new expertise with neighbors and continues to assure them of the EU process. 
Though the government is on its way towards peaceful relations with its former enemies, 
the possibility of future disputes between Croatia and its Balkan neighbors, particularly Serbia, 
cannot be ruled out; however, the country’s EU accession process has proved that leadership is 
the key ingredient for access. The willingness of Croatian politicians to swallow their pride, fight 
nationalist sentiments, and reach agreements with these powers proves that EU membership is 
indeed a powerful force guiding democratization in the Balkans. 
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APENDIX 1: CROATIA EU TIMELINE 
Date Status 
01-06-2000  
 
Feira European Council states all SAP countries are "potential candidates" 
for EU membership 
29-10-2001  
 
Stabilization and Association Agreement signed 
21-02-2003 Croatia applies for EU membership 
01-04-2004  
 
Commission approves Croatia's application for EU membership 
01-06-2004 Council confirms Croatia as candidate country 
01-12-2004 Council sets 17 March 2005 as start date for negotiations conditional upon 
full cooperation with the ICTY 
01-02-2005 Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) enters into force 
16-03-2005 EU postpones start of accession negotiations due to failure to cooperate 
with ICTY but adopts negotiation framework 
20-10-2005 'Screening' stage of accession negotiations begins 
12-06-2006 1st chapter of accession negotiations  formally opened and provisionally 
closed at ministerial-level conference 
30-06-2011 Last of the 35 negotiating chapters is closed 
12-10-2011  
 
Commission issues favorable opinion on Croatia's accession to EU and 
adopts last progress report 
06-12-2011 Council adopts decision on admission of Croatia 
09-12-2011 EU and Croatia sign accession treaty 
22-01-2012 66% of voters approve of EU membership in referendum 
01-07-2013 Croatia joins the EU 
 
 
The European Commission. Enlargement: Croatia. Web. 
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